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Since 1970, legislatures have increasingly relied on preventive de-
tention-detention before trial ordered solely to prevent an accused
from committing crime during the pretrial period-as an instrument
of social control.' Prior to this period, detention before trial was usu-
ally ordered only to assure an accused's presence at trial or to ensure
the integrity of the trial process by preventing an accused from tam-
pering with witnesses. Today, the majority of states and the federal
system have changed their laws to allowjudges to detain arrestees who
pose a risk to society if released during the pretrial period.2 Half of
these laws were passed in the 1980's.3
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1 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 1332 (1981 & Supp. 1995).
2 Mary Toborg &John Bellassai, Attempts to Predict Violence: Research Findings and Legisla-
tive Responses, in THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 101, 107 (Fernard N. Dutile &
Cleon H. Foust eds., 1987); John Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of
Bail Reform, 76J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1985).
3 Toborg & Bellassai, supra note 2, at 108 (adding together the 15 states mentioned
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The significant increase in the use of detention before trial to
prevent crime has not occurrred without debate and legal challer~ge.
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s ensured that preven-
tive detention would continue to be part of legal proceedings in crimi-
nal courts throughout the country. Schall v. Martin4 upheld a New
York statute authorizing the preventive detention of juvenile delin-
quents, and United States v. Salerno5 upheld the federal Bail Reform Act
of 19846 which authorized the use of preventive detention in federal
criminal prosecutions. Although the Supreme Court in both cases re-
jected the use of detention before trial for punitive purposes,7 it ap-
proved its use as a non-punitive regulatoy governmental power to
prevent future crimes and thereby advance state objectives to protect
community safety.
Thus, the degree to which preventive detention furthers its com-
munity safety purpose depends entirely upon the capacity to predict
who will commit a crime over a specified period of time. These short-
term predictions of dangerousness are made for defendants awaiting
further court appearances. Both Schall and Salerno challenged the use
of preventive detention on the ground that the prediction capacity is
too poor tojustify its use, but these challenges were squarely rejected.
In both cases, the Court concluded that predictions of dangerousn'ess
were not so unreliable as to pose due process or equal protection con-
cerns. 8 In Schall, the Court emphasized that "there is nothing inher-
ently unattainable about prediction of future criminal conduct";9 it
also acknowledged that the prediction of future criminal conduct is
"an experienced prediction based on a host of variables which cannot
be readily codified."' 0 However, the validity ofjudicial predictions of
dangerousness is unknown, and the consequences of false predictions
of future crimes remain the hidden cost of preventive detention. The
predictive validity of judicial determinations of dangerousness inher-
ent in preventive detention is the focus of this research.
and the Bail Reform Act of 1984).
4 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
5 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
6 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-56 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
7 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-38 (1979); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d
1321 (D.C. Cir. 1981). However, the decision in Schallalso noted that the terms and condi-
tions under which preventive detention is imposed must satisfy due process protections,
which may include rights to counsel, rebuttal, and confrontation of wimesses. Secig, 467
U.S. at 274.
8 Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-81; Sarno, 481 U.S. at 751.




A. BAIL REFORM AND THE EVOLUTION OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Preventive detention was part of the second generation of "bail
reform" in the 1970s and beyond." Historically, bail statutes were
designed to assure the defendant's appearance at court proceedings.
This second bail reform effort followed very closely upon the first and
differed sharply from it. The first reforms, in the 1960s, were aimed
principally at eliminating the unregulated use of pretrial detention,
primarily among poor defendants in urbanjails. Reformers were criti-
cal of the conditions of confinement in American jails, the discrimina-
tory setting of unaffordable bail for the urban poor, and the indirect
use of punitive detention.
12
Judges were empowered to set bail indiscriminately. Through
this power, judges set unaffordable bail amounts to detain many de-
fendants who they regarded as public safety threats. This unofficial
use of detention was unacknowledged by courts, in part because there
was reason to believe at the time that the Supreme Court would de-
clare the formal use of preventive detention for presumptively inno-
cent defendants unconstitutional. 13
In 1970, Congress held hearings to consider legislation that
would officially embrace the use of preventive detention to protect the
public from dangerous defendants during the period from arraign-
ment through trial. 14 By 1980, preventive detention was codified in
several states, including Florida, California, and the District of Colum-
bia. 15 For example, the Florida law said, "it is the intent of the legisla-
ture that the primary consideration [for pretrial detention] be the
protection of society from risk of physical harm to persons."16 The
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 further moved the emphasis in bail
decisions toward the use of denial of bail for the purpose of commu-
nity protection. 17 Ironically, preventive detention was becoming a
prominent feature of pretrial decision-making just as pretrial release
and innovations such as Release on Recognizance (ROR) and condi-
S1 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 6.
12 See Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 3-5; DANIELJ. FREED & PATRICIA M. WALD, BAIL IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1964 (1964); WAYNE H. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976); MAL-
COLM M. FEELY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979).
13 See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951) (stating that the purpose of bail is to
assure a defendant's appearance at trial). See al/o Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
14 Arthur Angel et al., Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L L
REv. 300 (1971); John Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55
VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969); Lawrence Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: PreventiveJustice in the World
ofJohn Mitchell, 56 WV. L. REv. 371 (1970).
15 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(1) (West 1985); CAL. CONST. ART. 1 § 12 (1982);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 25-1321-32 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
16 Goldkamp supra note 2, at 21; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(1) (West 1985).
17 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-56 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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tional release had nearly replaced the traditional cash bail system.18
The Schall and Salerno decisions completed the transformation of the
purpose of bail from its traditional emphasis on ensuring court ap-
pearance to the protection of the public from dangerous persons.
These developments raise two concerns. First, preventive deten-
tion statutes reintroduce relatively standardless bases for detention de-
cisions. The bail reforms of the 1960s attempted to eliminate
arbitrariness by providing meaningful criteria for judicial considera-
tion in setting bail.1 9 Critics of the old cash bail system correctly com-
plained that the absence of such criteria were invitations to disparity
and capriciousness. 20
Unfortunately, the new preventive detention statutes commonly
fail to be precise in defining eligibility for detention. Even when stat-
utes are explicit in permitting detention on grounds of "dangerous-
ness," they frequently fail to provide specific standards for
determining dangerousness. 2' Terms such as "threat," "danger," and
"public safety" are operationally defined in fewer than half the statutes
with such references. Rarely are distinctions made between threats to
the "community" and threats to potential "victims." Many states in-
clude threats to property in their definitions, leading to obvious
problems in interpretation, uniformity, and validation of statutes.
Most important, the standardless bases for making detention decisions
risk false prediction by their broad application to pretrial defendants
who may not be reasonably considered "dangerous."22
The second concern-and the one which this Article addresses-
is the inability to validate the efficacy ofjudicial predictions of danger-
ousness made under these statutes. Because defendants are detained
prior to committing an act, it has not been possible to validate the
prediction of their future wrongdoing. Once a person is detained as
dangerous, it is impossible to demonstrate that the detention was un-
necessary or wrongful. According to Goldkamp, the degree to which
judges wrongfully detain defendants is unknowable because their de-
cisions "are unfalsifiable."23
18 Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L
REV. 335 (1990).
19 SeeJohn S. Goldkamp, Two CLASSES OF THE ACCUSED (1979); Goldkamp, supra note
2, at 2-3.
20 JEFFREY A. ROTH & PAUL B. WICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN THE DiSTRicr
OF COLUMBIA (1978);JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. GOTI-RmDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES
FOR BAIL: AN EXPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM (1985).
21 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 27.
22 See, e.g., Angel et al., supra note 14; Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct
and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 717, 725 (1972).
23 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 28.
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As a result, more than a decade after passage of the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984, the efficacy of preventive detention laws remains
unknown. The conditions of vague definitions and unfalsifiability
confound efforts to evaluate preventive detention. Precise definitions
and standards of dangerousness are crucial to researchers interested
in determining exactly what is being predicted so that they may estab-
lish whether the predictions are reliable. Ultimately, however, the ef-
ficacy of preventive detention schemes can only be established by a
careful validation of the accuracy of the prediction methods used to
make preventive detention decisions. 24 This poses the greatest chal-
lenge since legal and ethical issues in judicial decisions lead to the
unfalsifiability problem. The only way to determine the accuracy of
preventive detention predictions is to release defendants who are pre-
dicted to commit new crimes during the pretrial period in order to
determine the precise degree to which they are risks for future crimes.
1. Definitional Problems
Preventive detention involves a short-term prediction of danger-
ousness, or the prediction of some future harm. However, many stat-
utes fail to use precise definitions of pretrial danger;,25 the absence of
definitional standards makes it difficult to determine what is being
prevented, what is the type and magnitude of the harm predicted, and
what is the predicted level of risk and the rate of that harm. The
product of these variables constitutes "dangerousness."
The development of definitions of danger have focused on two
concerns: danger to the public generally posed by the defendant, and
danger posed to potential victims or witnesses. Most state laws that
allow for preventive detention specifically refer to violent offenses. A
few states and the District of Columbia include harm to or intimida-
tion of witnesses and jurors, or broader concerns of possible interfer-
ence with the judicial process as a component of pretrial danger.2 6
Some statutes exclude particular types of defendants from pretrial re-
lease, such as those already on pretrial release for particular types of
offenses or defendants on probation or parole for an earlier
conviction.
The Supreme Court in Schall allowed the preventive detention of
juveniles once a judge concluded that there was a "serious risk" that
the juvenile would commit any crime, no matter how trivial, if re-
24 von Hirsch, supra note 22, at 726.
25 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 22-28; Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Danger-
ouse, 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 11 (1985).
26 Goldkamp, supra note 2 at 18.
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leased.2 7 This breadth is obviously problematic. Several states allow
for preventive detention of defendants under statutes that lack spe-
cific references to public safety concerns.2 8 In Salerno, however, the
Court upheld a rather specific preventive detention law which author-
ized detention only for the following crimes: (1) a crime of violence;
(2) a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death; (3) a major
drug offense; or (4) a felony committed by a person previously con-
victed of two of the crimes listed.29 In Salerno, the Supreme Court
characterized preventive detention as the "civil regulation of a danger-
ous person."30 This definition of dangerousness encompasses three
dimensions of criminal behavior: (1) chronicity; (2) assaultive behav-
ior; and (3) particular crimes (in this case, drug offenses) that have
been assigned a unique societal threat.
Most states define categories of defendants who are eligible for
preventive detention. Eligibility entails a variety of criteria: charged
offense, prior record, probation or parole status at the time of arrest,
pretrial release status at the time of arrest, threats to witnesses orju-
rors following arrest, and risk assessments of "dangerousness." Such
criteria speak more to descriptions of defendants rather than the
harms or acts they are anticipated to commit. Although it is not the
sole determinant for defining eligibility for denial of release, the se-
verity of the current charge is the primary criterion in most states.
3 l
However, the states vary widely in the scope of the current charge.
Moreover, specificity in the designation of classes of defendants eligi-
ble for preventive detention does not make these statutes specific with
respect to standards. Even when "danger" or "public safety" concerns
are explicit, most states fail to provide operational standards or defini-
tions for these constructs.
Accordingly, preventive detention statutes, even the most specific
ones, are inadequate with respect to definitions and decision stan-
dards for detention.3 2 All agree that preventive detention is justified,
if at all, when it succeeds at preventing pretrial violent crimes, includ-
ing the threat of physical harm.33 Because the base rate of violence is
27 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255 (1984).
28 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 20 n.18. In addition to persons charged with capital
offenses, Texas judges may deny bail to persons charged with felonies who have two or
more prior felony convictions and to persons charged with unspecified felonies while on
pretrial release in connection with other unspecified felony charges. Tax. CONsT. art. I.,
§§ 11.1 la. Similar statutes exist in Nebraska, NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9, New York, N.Y. CluM.
PROC. LAw § 510.30, and Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.487.
29 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-56 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
30 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987).
31 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 25.
32 von Hirsch, supra note 22, at 725-26.
33 Morris & Miller, supra note 25, at 12.
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low, researchers have predicted two effects of the use of preventive
detention: over-incarceration (that is, confining people who would
not have committed violence if released) and a modest reduction (on




The theoretical and legal basis for preventive detention rests on
ilie claim that courts can identify those who will commit future crimes
during the pretrial period. This goes beyond the assertion that many
criminals are recividists, the basis for predictions of danger that was
approved by the Supreme Court prior to Schal35 In Jurek v. Texas,36
Which upheld the use of prediction of future criminality for convicted
rntirderers facing the death penalty, the Court emphasized that sen-
tencing intrinsically involves a prediction of probable future conduct
in determining what sentence to impose.3 7 This is a long-term predic-
tion of behavior over someone's lifetime. The Schall Court relied
upoi Jurek in reaching the very different conclusion that short-term
predictions are attainable by using experts who are able to identify
particularly dangerous individuals from a larger class.38 However, pre-
dictions of dangerousness of competent persons over the extremely
short pretrial detention period raise distinct issues for the state and
for the individual from those raised by long-term predictions inherent
iri sentencing or civil commitment.3 9
Although some commentators consider preventive detention to
be a form of unregulated punishment,40 the Supreme Court in both
Schall and Salerno refused to concede that such detention constitutes
any kind of punishment. The Schall Court concluded that detention
to ensure a defendant's appearance in court serves a nonpunitive reg-
ulatory function.41 It is one thing, however, to label detention to en-
34 Se Angel et al., supra note 14, at 332.
35 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983),Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
86 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
37 Id. at 272.
38 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
39 See Morris & Miller, supra note 25, at n.1. In addition toJurek and its rejection of the
criticisms of the validity of short-term prediction, the Schall decision also invoked parens
pattiae to justify detention ofjuveniles. In so doing, the Court failed to recognize different
typ s ofjuvenile wrongdoing, and conflated the status ofjuveniles under the law with no-
tions of public safety and danger. The Scha/ decision even went so far as to condone
predietion based on variables that could not readily be codified. Id.
40 Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 18.
41 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979)).
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sure attendance at future judicial proceedings as purely "regulatory."
The state unquestionably has the authority to ensure attendance at
judicial proceedings as a necessary component of its judicial function.
Adjudicating guilt and innocence and meting out appropriate punish-
ment for guilty defendants plainly are regulatory functions in adminis-
tering the justice system. The Supreme Court in Salerno regarded
preventive detention as civil regulation of a "dangerous person."42 Af-
ter using this convenient term, the Salerno Court concluded that "the
Government's regulatory interest in community safety can . . . out-
weigh an individual's liberty interest."43
3. Predictions of Defendant Risk
Morris and Miller distinguish between three types of prediction:
"anamnestic," "actuarial," and "clinical."44 It is not always clear which
of these predictions best describes the judicial decisions in preventive
detention. Although the predictions in Schall resembled clinical pre-
dictions made by judges, experts who looked at the New York scheme
for assessing pretrial dangerousness criticized the predictions as more
closely resembling "hunches" or "guesses."45
Jurisdictions typically rely on three factors for determining pre-
trial dangerousness: prior criminal record, 46 seriousness of the cur-
rent offense,47 and judicial discretion.48  However, there is little
42 U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987).
43 Id. at 748. In upholding preventive detention in Salerno, the Court cited cases that
approved the long-term, open-ended confinement of mentally unstable and dangerous
persons within the civil commitment structure, including dangerous criminal defendants who
were mentally ill and incompetent to stand trial. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983).
44 Morris and Miller, supra note 25, at 13, 14. Anamnestic predictions rely on past be-
havior in similar situations to predict the likelihood that the defendant will behave in the
same way now. Actuarial predictions are based on assessments of how "similar" people,
socially situated in the same contexts and possessing the same characteristics, have behaved
in the past to predict how an individual will behave in the future. These predictions rely
on objective criteria and make predictions about a class of persons who possess certain
characteristics. Clinical predictions are made about a specific individual by an expert who
knows something more about the individual than simply objective facts. Clinical predic-
tions include elements of the anamnestic and actuarial predictions, but also incorporate
judgments and diagnoses by psychological and psychiatric professionals trained in mental
health and mental illness. Clinical predictions often are intuitive rather than verifiable.
45 Leslie Wilkins testified as an expert witness in the trial phase of the Schall case that he
"would be surprised if recommendations based on intake interviews were better than
chance and assessed the judge's subjective prognosis about the probability of future crime
as only four percent better than chance-virtually wholly unpredictable." 513 F. Supp. at
708.
46 Twenty-one states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system, use this crite-
rion. Toborg & Bellassai, supra note 2, at 108.
47 Twenty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system use this criterion, in
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empirical evidence that these charge-related bases for detention are
good indicators of criminality during the pretrial period.49 Because
judges must focus on the short-term danger posed-by the defendant,
they must rely on information about unproven prior acts and antici-
pated future conduct, as well as on subjective information of the per-
sonal restraints and social controls that will regulate the defendant's
behavior if released. For this reason, juvenile court judges in Schall
commonly considered such factors as the presence of family members
at the detention hearing as an indication of the availability of familial
controls during the pretrial period.50
As applied, preventive detention reflects some combination of ac-
tuarial and clinical predictions. The actuarial component involves a
complex framework of judicial experience and normative expecta-
tions derived from the accumulation of knowledge from decisions
made over lengthy periods of pretrial decision-making. It also reflects
a normative consensus among the court's everyday "working group" of
decision-makers regarding particular individuals and types of cases.51
The clinical dimension of the preventive detention decision reflects
the judges' professional opinion based on clinical elements that can-
not be identified actuarially. These include judgments about the de-
fendants' demeanor, dress, and perceptions of the quality of
supervision from parents or caretakers. 52 The Schall Court summed
up this process as the amalgam of "experienced prediction based on a
host of variable factors" that we recognize as a clinical prediction.53
A crucial difference, of course, is that traditional clinical assess-
ments by psychological professionals are rendered only after lengthy
interviews and reviews of case records. Preventive detention decisions,
by contrast, are made by judges often in a matter of minutes and fre-
combination with others. KL
48 See also Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 24.
49 JOHN S. GOLDKAMP Er AL., A STUDY OF POLICY GUIDELINES: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
CORRECTIONS (1981). One commentator who has surveyed the United States' laws on de-
tendon found that 27 jurisdictions authorize judges to distinguish dangerous defendants
by assessing who is dangerous. Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 30.
50 The deterrent component of pretrial detention is eliminated forjuveniles since cash
bail is not posted. Other deterrent threats underlying pretrial release involve the possibil-
ity that more stringent conditions may replace the original conditions, or that additional
penalties may be imposed. See Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 48. Since pretrial flight is an
unexpected behavior for juveniles and there is no possibility of forfeiture of cash bail,
there are few conditions that can constitute a deterrent threat.
51 See, e.g.,JAMEs EISENSTEIN & HERBERTJACOB, FELONYJUSTICE (1983); ROBERT M. EMER-
SON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969).
52 See EMERSON, supra note 51; ANNE MAHONEY, THE JUVENILE COURT IN CONTEXT
(1987); KIMBERLY KEMPF ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF APPARENT DISPARITIES IN THE HANDLING OF
BLACK YOUTH WITHIN MISSOURI'SJUVENILEJuSTICE SYSTEM (1993).
53 Schall v Martin, 367 U.S. 253, 274 (1984).
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quently on the basis of unverified information. In Barefoot v. Estelle,54
the Supreme Court noted that "psychiatrists and psychologists are ac-
curate in no more than one in three predictions of violent behavior
over a several year period among institutionalized populations that
had committed violence in the past."55 What may we expect when
judges are asked to make short-term predictions about a heterogene-
ous group of defendants where information is sketchy and unverified
regarding the elements that comprise risk?
4. The Validity ofJudicial Predictions of Dangerousness
for Pretrial Defendants
The benefit of testing the accuracy of judicial predictions has
long been recognized, but the social and personal costs have seemed
too high. Simply stated, once an individual has been determined to
be dangerous by ajudge, the safest recourse is to confine that person.
Some studies have tested the accuracy of predictions by mental health
personnel.56 A number of studies have attempted to examine the pre-
dictive capacities of bail and pretrial detention by determining the
amount of crime committed by persons on release status.57 This re-
search has been limited to pretrial rearrest rates of persons who have
been released by courts on ball or on their own recognizance.8
These studies have examined what persons released by courts have
done during the pretrial period. However, the proposition that courts
can identify criminal defendants who are likely to commit crimes
before trial if released has never been directly subject to systematic
study.59 As a result, the claim that courts possess the ability to predict
pretrial danger of arrestees has become an unfalsifiable assertion as
preventive detention becomes more widespread: those deemed dan-
gerous have been denied liberty during the pretrial period and not
accorded an opportunity to commit crimes. No study has tested the
accuracy of judicial predictions that defendants will recidivate wheri
54 463 U.S. 889 (1983).
55 Id. at 900 n.7.
56 See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
57 GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 20; ROTH & WICE, supra note 20; MARY A.
TOBORG, PRETRIAL RELEASE ASSESSMENT OF DANGER AND FLiGHT: METHOD MAKES A DIFFER-
ENCE (1984).
58 GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 20; Angel et al., supra note 14.
59 This is is the first study to look at the activity of accused criminals for whom a predic-
tion of commission of crimes was made but who nonetheless were released. Prior studie§
noted the impossibility of studying this group of persons because it was a null group. See
Angel et al., supra note 14, at 306 n.29 (213 defendants in the study had to be excluded




they are preventively detained.60
Efforts to predict both pretrial crime and those defendants who
will commit such crimes run headlong into base rate problems. Base
rate estimates of pretrial crime are generally low6' and are especially
difficult to compute for juveniles. Indeed, the base rate of pretrial
crime among juvenile defendants is unknown and estimates based
upon adult pretrial crime rates are problematic62 as studies of pretrial
crime among adults vary depending on the classification of pretrial
crime. The rate of pretrial violent crime for adults appears to be par-
ticularly low, ranging from 3% to 7%.63 Toborg and colleagues re-
ported a 7% pretrial rearrest rate for violent offenses among 3,000
District of Columbia defendants arrested in 1981 for violent of-
fenses.64 Analyses of more than 4,000 defendants released in Philadel-
phia between 1977 and 1979 revealed a pretrial rearrest rate for serious
offenses of 6%.65 Pretrial rearrest rates for any felony vary from 3%66
to nearly 40%.67
Base rates establish probabilities for defined groups,68 but the
epistemology of prediction provides extremely weak grounds for mak-
60 The only study which comes even close is one conducted in 1962: Jonas R. Rappe-
port et al., Evaluations and Follow-up of State Hospital Patients Who Had Sanity Hearings. 118
AM.J. PsvHCIARa 1079 (1962). They studied 73 patients who requested court hearings to
obtain release from a psychiatric hospital. Forty-seven of these were remanded to the hos-
pital by the court. Twelve of the 47 subsequently escaped. The investigation studied the
community adjustment of these 12 individuals after at least one year. The study found that
42% of the escaped patients made a satisfactory adjustment to the community;, they had
not been in serious trouble with the law, had not been rehospitalized, and were caring for
themselves. See Bruce Ennis & Thomas Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. Rxv. 693, 717 (1974).
61 See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 18, at 318-405.
62 See Michael H. Tonry, Prediction and Clmssification: Legal and Ethical Issues, in PREDIC-
TION AND CLASSIFICATIoN 367 (Don M. Gottfredson & Michael H. Tonry eds., 1987).
63 Toborg & Bellassai, supra note 2, at 103.
64 MARY A. TOBORG, PRETRIAL RiSK ASSESSMENT IN THE DrsTrCT OF COLUMBIA: THE EF-
FECrS OF CHANGED PROCEDURES (1984). Taking the definition of violent offenses from the
District of Columbia statute, the researchers included murder, rape, carnal knowledge,
indecent liberties with minors, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, voluntary man-
slaughter, extortion with threats, arson, assault, and assault with a deadly weapon.
6 5 JOHN S. GoLDKAmp Er AL, BAIL DECISIONMAKING: A STUDY OF PoLicY UIDELINES
(1981). Serious charges were defined as homicide, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, aggra-
vated assault, and manufacture, delivery, or sale of drugs.
66 Lawrence Sherwood-Fabre, An Experiment in Ball Reform: Evaluating Pretrial Re-
lease Service Agencies in Federal District Courts 85-86, 89-40 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Indiana University).
67 Douglas Smith et al., Drug Use and Pretrial Misconduct in New York City, 5 J. QuacrrrA-
TIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1989); John S. Goldkamp et al., Pretrial Drug Testing and Defendant
Risk 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1990).
68 David Farrington & Roger Tarling, Criminological Prediction: The Way Forward, in Par-
DICTION IN CRIMINOLOGY 20 (David Farrington & Roger Tarling eds., 1985). See also Toborg
& Bellassai, supra note 2, at 116.
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ing any prediction about a particular person, especially when the pre-
diction is short-term. When base rates are low-as they appear to be
for pretrial juvenile crime-the capacity to make accurate individual
predictions of short-term criminality is particularly questionable. Sev-
eral studies have estimated the accuracy of short-term predictions by
using the statutory criteria for detention-eligible arrestees. These
studies have concluded that the criteria for detention eligibility is a
poor predictor of who will commit a crime during the pretrial pe-
riod. 69 There is general consensus that the capacity to predict pretrial
crime on the basis of statutory standards for determining dangerous-
ness is no better than one in three correct predictions.
70
The problems are different when base rates are high. In these
circumstances, the difficulty involves developing bases to make predic-
tions that improve on randomness. The difficulty of predicting events
increases as the base rate falls below 50%.71 Because violent criminal-
ity is a rare event, the establishment of a valid base expectancy rate is
critical. When the "true" rate of pretrial violence is one-in-ten, a one-
in-three prediction is not a low rate of prediction. In fact, it would be
quite high relative to the actual base rate. But a one-in-three predic-
tion is poor relative to a 50% base rate. Even when the base rate is
relatively high for a particular group, predicted future dangerousness
will vary dramatically within the group.72 For this reason, the assign-
ment of a threshold for an individual becomes a critical decision in
determining which members of the group pose a sufficient risk to jus-
tify preventive detention. Given the low base rates of pretrial juvenile
crime, the reduction in crime through preventive detention is likely to
be quite low unless this threshold is set unreasonably low, close to the
low base rate.
In general, predictions of pretrial failure invariably fail to im-
prove on either chance or on the base rate. 73 The Supreme Court
acknowledged in Barefoot v. Estelle that no study has predicted .future
criminal behavior for any group over any length of time at greater
69 Angel et al., supra note 14, at 324-30; Torborg & Bellassai, supra note 2, at 104;
GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 20.
70 Torborg & Bellassai, supra note 2, at 104. See also Morris & Miller, supra note 25, at
14; JEAN FLOUD & WARREN YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1981); JOHN
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983).
71 See, e.g., Paul E. Meehl &Albert Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psycho-
metric Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores, 52 PSYCHIATRY BULL. 194 (1955); Farrington &
Tarling, supra note 68, at 20.
72 Don M. Gottfredson, Prediction and Classification in Criminal]ustice Decision Making, in
PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION, supra note 62.
73 Stephen E. Gotffredson, Prediction: Methodological Issues, in PREDICTION AND CLASSIFI-
CATION, supra note 62.
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than one accurate prediction for every two inaccurate predictions.74
These problems are even more acute for the short-term predictions
inherent in preventive detention. Jackson's review of preventive de-
tention notes that "[t]hree noteworthy findings emerge from studies:
(1) arrests of pretrial releasees for serious crimes are relatively infre-
quent; (2) the ability to accurately predict pretrial crime, however
measured, is very poor; and (3) the level of pretrial crimes correlates
positively with time on release." 75
Finally, whether rearrest rates alone confirm pretrial crime has
been disputed. Rearrest rates may be underinclusive because they do
not reflect undetected crimes.76 However, at the same time, they may
be overinclusive because they equate an arrest with guilt.7 7 While the
number of actual crimes by active offenders may exceed their arrests,
there is no basis to conclude that nonarrested juveniles are commit-
ting undetected crimes at similar rates, or even any crimes at all. In
fact, only about half of those arrested are usually convicted, and often
for an offense that is not the primary concern of dangerousness stat-
utes.78 For example, only 40% of those rearrested while on pretrial
release in the District of Columbia were subsequently convicted of the
crime for which they were rearrested.7 9 Moreover, the detection and
apprehension of crimes reflects contingencies unrelated to the crimi-
nal event, often tied to a suspect's neighborhood of residence and
policing practices in that area.80 Nonetheless, rearrest is the only eas-
ily obtained and the only legally relevant measure of pretrial criminal-
ity.8 1 Any other measure or construction, including the use of
coefficients to factor in undetected crime and factor out wrongful ar-
rests, involves a level of interpretation that is impossible to resolve sat-
isfactorily and fairly.
74 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983) (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981)).
75 Patrick Jackson, The Impact of Pretrial Preventive Detention, 12 JUST. SYs. 305, 307
(1987).
76 THOMAS LrrwAcK FT AL., THE ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS AND PREDICTIONS OF
VIOLENCE: RECENT RESEARCH AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (1991).
77 Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 18, at 403-404. See also Tonry, supra note 62.
78 STEPHEN CLARKE ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAIL SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF FAILURE
TO APPEAR IN COURT AND REARREST WHILE ON BAIL (1976); GoLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON,
supra note 20; Angel et al., supra note 14, at 309; Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail
Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67 (1963); ROTH &
WICE, supra note 20.
79 ROTH & WICE, supra note 20, at vi, 11-48-51.
80 See, e.g., Douglas Smith, The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior, in COMMUNITIES
AND CRIME 313 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry eds., 1986).
81 See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 18, at 403. See alsoJackson, supra note 75, at
307 ("Most studies of this subject are based on rearrest data, which may understate actual
criminal activity, overstate probable criminal behavior, or both.").
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5. The Problems of False Positives and False Negatives
Finally, the statutory authority for preventive detention in the
Schall case empowered judges to detain defendants whenever the
judge considered their risk of criminality to be high, recognizing that
at least in some instances, the juvenile would not commit any crime.
The assessment of these predictions is especially important because it
provides an estimate of the number of persons detained unnecessarily
in order to prevent crime. The threshold at which the number of
needlessly detained individuals becomes too high is not reducible to a
mathematical formula. But it may be useful to view false positives as
individuals who are deprived of their liberty for utilitarian purposes
unrelated to their own danger. Once these individuals are considered
to be among a larger group of the "potentially dangerous," they are
subject to loss of liberty not because their potential will be realized,
but because an indeterminate number of the group will realize theirs.
Accordingly, unconvicted individuals are jailed not to stop them
from any wrongdoing but in order to throw a wide enough net to
cover others who, if not stopped, would endanger society. It is one
thing, after conviction, to deprive someone who is no threat to society
of his or her liberty for utilitarian purposes.8 2 In those circumstances,
the convicted person has forfeited liberty based on his or her wrong-
doing. But before conviction, it is difficult to discern how the individ-
ual has forfeited anything. The only thing he or she has done, at this
point in the criminal justice process, is get arrested.8 3
The recurring errors in predictions must always be balanced by
two additional considerations. First, does the cost of trying to prevent
pretrial crime outweigh the benefits? Here, the problems of defini-
tion and prediction intersect. For these purposes, dangerousness is
the product of the crime to be avoided and the predicted rate or odds
of its occurrence.8 4 When base rates are low, so is the probability that
82 See Note, Rules For An Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted
of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 281, 287 (1982) (distinguishing
between detaining someone for what they have done in the past and detaining someone
for what they might do in the future).
83 See Anthony Bottoms & Roger Brownsword, Dangerousness and Rights, in DANGEROUS-
NESS: PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION 10 (John W. Hinton ed., 1983) (arguing
that if ever preventive confinement on utilitarian grounds is permissible, four distinct qual-
ities must be considered: the seriousness of the danger (i.e. the degree of injury is contem-
plated), temporality (how frequent), immediacy (how soon), and certainty (how sure are we).
See also von Hirsch, supra note 22, at 740 ("[if a system of preventive incarceration is
known systematically to generate mistaken confinements, then it is unacceptable in abso-
lute terms because it violates the obligation of society to individualjustice. Such a system
cannot be justified by arguing that its aggregate social benefits exceed the aggregate
amount of injustice done to mistakenly confined individuals.").
84 Morris & Miller, supra note 25, at 11.
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the harm to be avoided would occur. Even within a group where base
rates may be higher, the ceiling on predictions within those groups-
for example, at one-in-three, as the Supreme Court suggested in Bare-
foot v. Este/Le-indicates that the total harm is likely to be insubstantial.
When the base rates are actually far lower-for example, one-in-ten as
reported in the assessment of the District of Columbia preventive de-
tention statute85 -the total harm is extremely low, especially when the
harm to be avoided is ill-defined and subject to overreach.
In the case of pretrial juvenile defendants, the costs both to the
detained adolescent and to his or her community are quite high in
terms of foreshadowing their eventual finding of delinquency and se-
rious disposition. Detention causes considerable adverse impact on
the detainee, including loss of employment or educational opportuni-
ties, separation from family, persistent future disadvantage in the
workplace that results in poor job outcomes, and the ordinary incon-
veniences of being jailed.86 Pretrial detention ofjuveniles also has a
negative impact on the outcome of the case in court.87 The convic-
tion rate of detainees is higher, and because detainees are prevented
from demonstrating improved behavior in the community, prison
sentences are lengthier and more likely.88 Several studies have con-
eluded that "detention per se exhibits an independent effect on dispo-
sitions . . . . In operation, detention almost randomly imposes
punishment on some juveniles for no obvious reason and then pun-
ishes them again for having been punished before."89 This bias seems
particularly acute for juveniles:
Detention undermines the fairness of the criminal process in numerous
ways. The state's assumption of guilt inherent in detaining before trial
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those detained are more likely to
plead guilty, to be convicted if tried, and to receive a prison sentence.
Conversely, those released are less likely to plead guilty.90
The extent to which false positive and false negative problems
exist depends on the accuracy of predictions. Proponents of predic-
tive efficacy minimize the problem of false positives by arguing that
defendants are actually involved in more crimes than the police can
85 Angel et al., supra note 14, at 317.
86 ROBERTJ. SAMPSON &JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING (1993); Robert B. Free-
man, Crime and the Economic Status of Disadvantaged Young Men, in URBAN LABOR MARKr
AND JOB OPPoRTUNITIES 201 (George E. Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992).
87 Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention ofjuveniles and Its Impact
orn Case Dispositions, 76J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1132 (1985).
88 Ares et al., supra note 78, at 76; Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.
L, 11Ev. 641, 642 (1964).
89 Barry C. Feld, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study If When Lauyers
Appear and the Difference They Make, 79J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1338 (1985).
90 Miller & Guggenheim supra note 18, at 416 (foomotes omitted).
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detect. Proponents also exaggerate the problem of false negatives by
assigning a greater weight to these risks than to the costs of other
types of error. These arguments persist only because empirical re-
search has not yet tested the precise levels of predictive accuracy. In
turn, the assertions that informed the Schall and Salerno decisions will
remain unfalsifiable: "The scientific work necessary to define a group
and to assess its base expectancy rate of criminal violence within a
given period has not been done."91 Who then will form a comparison
group against which one arrested person's higher base expectancy
rate of dangerousness can justify his detention? Will it be other per-
sons arrested for a crime of similar gravity and with similar records?
On what standard shall we judge the accuracy of judicial predictions
of dangerousness? Morris & Miller suggest that:
the base expectancy rate of violence for the criminally-predicted as dan-
gerous must be shown by reliable evidence to be substantially higher
than the base expectancy rate of another criminal with a closely similar
criminal record and [convicted] of a closely similar crime but not pre-
dicted as unusually dangerous. 92
We agree, and such tests form the basis of the following experiment.
B. THIS STUDY
The litigation that led to the Schall decision created the circum-
stances for a natural experiment to test the validity ofjudicial predic-
tions of dangerousness for juvenile offenders. On June 1, 1981, a
federal judge enjoined the preventive detention ofjuvenile offenders
in New York State. The habeas corpus writ was issued pursuant to New
York Family Court Act § 320.5(3) (b),9 3 on behalf of all accused juve-
nile delinquents94 who were at that time or who may in the future be
detained in the custody of the New York City Commissioner of Juve-
91 Morris & Miller, supra note 25, at 20.
92 Id. at 37.
93 The subsection in its entirety reads:
The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and reasons for
so finding that unless the respondent is detained:
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return
date; or
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an act which
if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.
N.Y. FAM. Gr. Acr § 320.5 (3) (a) (b) (1983). Only the power to detain to prevent crime was
in issue in the federal lawsuit.
94 United States ex rel. Martin v. Davis, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub noam.
Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noa. Schall v. Martin, 476 U.S.
253 (1984). In New York, a juvenile delinquent is a person over seven and less than 16
years of age who committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult
but who is not criminally responsible for such conduct by reason of infancy. N.Y. FAm. CT.
Acr § 301.2 (1983).
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nile Justice. That section authorized the preventive confinement of
accused juveniles whenever a judge concluded that there was a "seri-
ous risk" the juvenile would commit a crime during the pretrial
period.
The continuing writ of habeas corpus, issued at the trial level of
Schall v. Martin, was in effect for three years. The order declared the
New York statute authorizing preventive detention unconstitutional. 95
However, the district court order only enjoined the Commissioner of
Juvenile Justice from detaining any juvenile ordered into detention
pursuant to the preventive detention statute. 96 Judges remained free
to rely on the statute when making detention decisions. 97 Whenever a
judge ordered a juvenile to be detained solely for preventive deten-
tion purposes, the juvenile was released from custody by the Commis-
sioner of Juvenile Justice without spending any time in the juvenile
detention facility.98 Altogether, seventy-four known juveniles were re-
leased in this fashion during the three years,99 presenting the oppor-
tunity to test empirically the assertion in Schall that predictions of
95 The power to detain accused delinquents to ensure their appearance at trial was
undisturbed by the federal court order. See N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 320.5(8) (a) (1983). Many
juveniles continued to be detained for that reason during this three year period. However,
no juveniles were preventively detained in New York City from June 1, 1981 to June 4,
1984.
96 The federal case was brought as a class action writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.C.S. § 2254(b) (1988). The named respondent was the jailor of the class, the Commis-
sioner ofJuvenileJustice. Nojudge was a named party to the action. Although the lawsuit
was centrally about the power ofjudges and their ability to predict behavior, the final order
issued by the district court, the writ of habeas corpus, only directly affected the Commis-
sioner ofJuvenile Justice. Judges, not being parties to the lawsuit, were not enjoined from
using the statute declared to be unconstitutional.
97 The declaration of unconstitutionality by the federal district court was in direct con-
flict with a decision rendered by New York's highest court in 1976. In People ex rel. Way-
burn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682 (N.Y. 1976), the Court of Appeals upheld the preventive
detention statute against an identical attack which was successful in federal court. This
conflict meant that judges sitting in the Family Court in 1981 after the federal decision was
handed down were free to continue to follow their own state's highest court decision and
carry on business as if the detention statute was still valid. This is what happened on at
least 74 occasions. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
98 By an arrangement between the plaintiffs' lawyers and the Commissioner ofJuvenile
Justice's office, whenever an attorney believed that ajudge had ordered his or her client to
be detained preventively, the attorney would speak with counsel for the Commissioner of
JuvenileJustice, who would make an investigation. If counsel for the Commissioner deter-
mined that the juvenile had been ordered into detention solely for preventive purposes,
she would direct that the juvenile be released immediately. In most cases, this determina-
tion was made before the juvenile even was put on the bus from the courthouse. In no
such case did the juvenile spend any time in the detention facility.
99 There were a larger number ofjuveniles who were ordered preventively detained.
But this larger group consisted ofjuveniles who were also detained to ensure their appear-
ance at trial. Because the power to detain for that purpose was unaffected by the federal




Thus, the restraining order created the conditions for a natural
experiment testing the validity of judicial predictions of dangerous-
ness-the release of a cohort of defendants predicted to be dangerous
and ordered into incarceration, but not incarcerated. 100 A consistent
decision standard and a consistent set of decision-makers were em-
ployed in a small number of courts that ordered preventive detention,
and the defendants were released prior to their incarceration.
II. METHODS
A. SAMPLES
Samples included (N=74) juveniles from the Brooklyn and
Queens Family Courts in New York City. The juveniles were re-
manded to custody under the preventive detention statute of the New
York Family Court Act during 1981 to 1984, and subsequently released
within hours of the detention order pursuant to an injunction ob-
tained in the federal district court for the Southern District of New
York. 101
Schall cases were identified through a procedure that required
confirmation by three parties involved in the detention decision.
First, judges noted in court minutes that detention was ordered
preventively. The judicial order for detention was based on ajudicial
conclusion that "there [was] a serious risk that [the juvenile] may
before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute a crime." 102 This judicial finding of serious risk is
analogous to a prediction of future behavior. Second, this status was
confirmed by attorneys for the prosecuting agency for delinquency
petitions in Family Court. Third, when the juvenile was remanded to
the custody of the detention authority, counsel for the detention au-
thority validated that this was a Schall case. Once validated, the
juveniles were released at the courthouse or the detention facility in-
stead of being admitted into the facility.
We assessed the validity of judicial predictions of dangerousness
in two ways. First, the arrest histories of the Schall cases were ex-
amined to determine whether predictions of dangerousness during
the pretrial period were accurate. Second, the base rates of rearrest
100 Jeffrey Fagan, Natural Experiments, in MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 103, 133
(1990).
101 United States ex rel. Martin v. Davis, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd sub nom.
Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 476 U.S.
253 (1984) [hereinafter, the Schall cases].
102 N.Y. FAM. Or. Acr § 320.5(b) (1983).
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were examined for a matched sample of juvenile offenders drawn
from the time period when the Schall injunction was in effect This
group was identical to the Schall group and provided an estimate of
the marginal gain in predictive efficiency from the judicial determina-
tion of dangerousness. These offenders were not detained during the
pretrial period.
The control group was constructed using a matched-cases proce-
dure. Matching criteria were selected from the results of principal
components analyses that determined the legal (offense, prior rec-
ord) and social characteristics that typified the Schall sample. The cri-
teria also were selected to control for social structural factors that are
associated with base rates of offenses and arrests. Five variables were
identified as matching variables: age, race, gender, committing of-
fense, and prior record (total prior court referrals, prior referrals for
violence). The defendant's census tract was added as an additional
matching criterion to control for social area characteristics and de-
ployment of police patrol services. Incomplete data for five Schall
cases and ten control cases required their deletion from the sample.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the final Schall and control
samples.
Most offenders were males (over 92%), African-American (about
60%), and 14.5 years of age at the time of the sample arrest. About
one-in-three were charged with a violent offense, and over half were
charged with non-violent felony offenses.'03 One-in-ten had no prior
record. Defendants with at least one prior apprehension had an aver-
age of three prior apprehensions. Over 45% had at least one prior
apprehension for a violent offense. Among both Schall and control
cases, four-in-ten (42.9%) had neither a prior nor a current charge for
a violent felony offense, suggesting that the assessment of their "dan-
gerousness" was unrelated to their involvement in violent crimes.
There were no significant differences in any of the social or legal
characteristics of the groups. Schall and control cases differed only on
the judicial determination of risk that the accused would commit a
crime if released. The bases for this determination may be reflected
in data not available systematically: the defendant's physical appear-
ance and demeanor in the courtroom, the presence of a family mem-
ber at the detention hearing, presence or use of weapons, or injury to
victims.
103 Violent offenses included any grades of crimes against persons that was punishable
by a term in prison, if committed by an adult: robbery, assault, manslaughter, rape or
sodomy, homicide, kidnap, or attempts of any of these crimes. Other offenses punishable









Violent Felony 86.9 37.5
Other Felony 50.8 54.7
Misdemeanor, PINS 12.3 7.8
PIOR RECORD
% First Apprehension 11.6 10.9
Mean No. Priorsa 2.9 2.8
% Prior Charges for Violence 47.8 44.4
AGE (years)
At Initial JS Contact 13.7 13.7





African American 60.3 59.4
Non-Hispanic White 13.2 12.5
Hispanic 23.5 25.0
Asian 2.9 3.1
a For those with at least one prior charge
B. DATA AND MEASURES
Social and legal histories were constructed for the Schall and con-
trol samples from official records in the Kings County (Brooklyn) and
Queens County Family Courts in New York City, and the City Proba-
tion Department and the Department of Juvenile Justice (the deten-
tion authority). Social histories were limited to social structural
characteristics since other information (defendants' family composi-
tion, school performance, and other social behaviors) was not uni-
formly available from any of the data sources.
Complete juvenile and criminal histories were compiled for the
interval from the subject's first family court appearance through Octo-
ber 31, 1987; those histories were segmented for the periods preced-
ing and following the sample arrest. Family court histories were
constructed from the same data sources. Adult criminal histories were
constructed from two sources: New York City criminal court arraign-
ments and state criminal justice records. Criminal history information
included the dates, charges, and dispositions of all court appearances.
[Vol. 86
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Rearrests for PINS offenses or outstanding warrants were excluded
since no new crime was alleged.
C. TEMPORAL CRITERIA FOR PREDICTIVE EFFICACY
To validate the prediction inherent in preventive detention, we
must be concerned about which crimes might happen in what time
interval, should the accused be released. The period of time for
which the prediction applies will vary depending on the court system
within which the case is located. Definitionally, the maximum time
period for pretrial detention is the maximum time period within
which the trial must occur. In most adult criminal courts, the speedy
trial period is six months. 0 4 Accordingly, the period of time over
which the prediction is being made should be the period of time
within which a trial must be held if the individual is released.
In NewYork, the juvenile detention statute expressly authorizes a
court to detain preventively if it concludes there is a serious risk that
the juvenile may "before the return date" commit a crime. Pretrial
detention may be extremely short-as short as three days and as long
as seventeen days; whenever ajuvenile is detained before trial in New
York, trials must take place as soon as three days after the confine-
ment begins for less serious crimes and within seventeen days for the
most serious cases.' 0 5 In NewYork City, the adjourned date in a delin-
quency case after an arraignment, when a juvenile is released, is com-
monly between four and six weeks.' 06 Even the four to six week
period in New York is too short. Cases commonly are adjourned for
trial when the juvenile returns to court for the first time after arraign-
ment. When cases are adjourned in this subsequent appearance, ordi-
narily no new facts about the juvenile's out-of-court conduct will be
presented. If the juvenile is on release status for this appearance, he
or she virtually always will remain in that status until the trial.
For these reasons, the fairest measure of time within which a
judge should be concerned with thejuvenile's out-of-court behavior is
the maximum time within which the trial must occur-the period
104 WAYNE R LAFAVE &JEROLD IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.3(c) (1984).
105 N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr § 340.1 (1983). The statute requires that the trial commence
within 14 days. Id. § 340.1(1). But it allows the court to delay the start of the trial for an
additional three days on its own motion or on motion of the prosecutor. Id. § 340.4(a).
Indeed, this period is for the most serious offenses. For misdemeanors and low level felo-
nies, the trial must begin within six days of detention. Id. § 340.1(1) (stating that the trial
must start within three days but permits the same three day adjournment just described,
thus providing a total of six days). Thejuvenile in detention may delay the start of the trial
"on good cause shown" for an additional 30 days. Id. § 340.4(b).
106 Telephone communication with Professor Randy Hertz of New York University
School of Law, May 1, 1995.
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from arraignment through the trial. Once the trial has been held,
one of two things will occur which will materially change the status of
the accused. If the accused is acquitted, the court's power to detain
evaporates, even if there still remains reason to believe there is a "seri-
ous risk" that he or she will commit a crime. If the accused is con-
victed, the presumption of innocence has been overcome. If
detention is continued, it no longer is pretrial. Detention after con-
viction, even before final sentencing, may be for punitive purposes.107
In New York City, the period from initial court appearance through
final disposition for delinquency petitions is ninety days.' 08 Accord-
ingly, the Schall and control groups were compared for all rearrests
and specifically for violent offenses within ninety days. To further as-
sess the validity of predictions of dangerousness, we have also looked
at rearrests beyond ninety days.
D. STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR PREDICTIVE EFFICACY
Under the Federal Bail Reform Act, and in many states, confine-
ment to prevent future crimes signifies a judicial determination of
"dangerousness."109 The Bail Reform Act, for example, limits those
eligible for preventive detention to persons charged with one of the
following: a "crime of violence"; a federal drug offense carrying a pen-
alty of ten years or more; any felony following convictions on two or
more offenses of these types; an offense carrying a penalty of life im-
prisonment or death; two or more comparable state or local offenses;
107 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (punishment before trial is constitution-
ally forbidden).
108 N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 340.1 provides that the trial must commence within 60 days
when the juvenile is not detained. However, an adjournment for an additional 30 days is
permissible. Id. Thus, the total period is 90 days. Any adjournment beyond that period is
justified only by a showing of"good cause" or "special circumstances," which is not granted
lightly. In re Frank C., 512 N.Y.S.2d 89 (N.Y. 1987). Lower courts have interpreted Frank
C. very strictly and the practice in the New York City Family Courts is to commence virtually
all delinquency trials within 90 days of the arraignment or the cases are dismissed or other-
wise settled. See In re Vincent M., 512 N.Y.S.2d 54, aff'd, 70 N.Y.S.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987).
109 Goldkamp, supra note 2. A different statute, unchallenged in the underlying litiga-
tion which served as the background for this study, authorized judges to detain juveniles to
assure their presence at trial. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 320.5 (3) (a) (1983). This traditional
ground for requiring the posting of bail is outside of this study. Whenever ajudge ordered
ajuvenile to be detained both because the judge concluded that detention was necessary
to assure the juvenile's presence at trial and because of the risk that the juvenile would
commit a crime if released, that juvenile was detained since there was no impediment to
the Commissioner ofJuvenile Justice accepting ajuvenile into detention in order to assure
thejuvenile's presence at trial. Only "pure" Schall cases were involved in this study. That
is, only those cases in which the solejustification for the detention order was the judge's
assessment of future crime risk.
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or a combination of such offenses. 1 0 These more narrowly focused
laws invariably limit detention to prevent only serious, violent felonies
(using such phrases as "dangerous crimes" or "crimes of violence").
A problem with the "dangerous" label is its overbreadth as ap-
plied in this study. In the Schall cases, judges were empowered to or-
der detention whenever they believed there was a risk the juvenile
would commit any "act which would constitute a crime," including
non-violent low-level misdemeanors, as well as behaviors that may ex-
pose the juvenile to harm. Many such acts, of course, fall well below
the definition of dangerousness. The New York Family Court statute
uses an expansive and far-reaching definition of "dangerousness" that
includes not only violence but the threat of any violation of penal
code statutes. During the period when the Schall injunction was in
effect, it is unclear the degree to which judges ordered detention to
prevent non-violent crimes, or simply to assure the health and welfare
of the juvenile. In fact, Table 1 shows that the term "dangerousness"
may be overly broad as applied to these cases.
Although the expansiveness of the Family Court statute presages
a high prediction rate,"' particular attention is paid in this study to
violent acts because most preventive detention schemes 1 2 are more
narrowly focused than the New York statute authorizing detention for
juveniles. Accordingly, we use dangerousness as the criterion variable
to assess predictive validity in this study and operationalize it to in-
clude violent felony offenses.
III. RESULTS
A. REARRESTS WITHIN 90 DAYS
Table 2 shows that Schall defendants were more likely to be rear-
rested within the ninety day period, regardless of the type of rearrest.
Over 40% of the Schall defendants were rearrested within ninety days,
compared to only 15.6% of the controls (X2= 16.18, p = .006). For
violent offenses, 18.8% of the Schall defendants were rearrested, com-
pared to 7.8% of the controls (X2= 6.82, p=.0 33 ). Evidently, for all
rearrests, judges accurately identified a group of defendants that
posed a higher risk of subsequent rearrest during the ninety day pe-
110 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988).
111 Obviously, it is easier to predict that an individual will commit any crime than it is to
predict that an individual will commit a narrow range of crimes because the former predic-
tion includes many more acts. Predicting that an individual will commit any of 100 acts,
for example, will be true more often than predicting that he or she will commit any of 10
acts.




riod when their cases typically reached conclusion.
Table 2
PERCENT ARRESTED WITHIN 90 DAYS BY SEVERITY OF REARREST CHARGE
REARREST CHARGES
ANY OFFENSE VioLENT FELONY
Schall Control Schall Control
N 69 64 69 64
% Rearrested within:
0 - 90 Days 40.6 15.6 18.8 7.8
More than 90 days 42.0 57.8 53.6 45.3
Not Rearrested 17.4 26.6 27.5 46.9
Statistics
Chi square 10.18 6.82
df 2 2
p .006 .033
The marginal gain in predictive efficiency for the Schall cases is
tempered by the high rate of false prediction evident in Table 2.
Nearly six-out-of-ten (59.4%) of the Schall defendants were not rear-
rested within the ninety day period, compared to about five-out-of-six
(84.4%) of the control cases. When violent felony offenses are ap-
plied as the standard for evaluating preventive detention decisions,
consistent with the Bail Reform Act criteria for dangerousness, the
false prediction rate for judicial decisions rises. More than eight-in-
ten (81.2%) Schall defendants were not rearrested for violent offenses
during the ninety day period, compared to more than nine-in-ten
(92.2%) control cases. Accordingly, while predictions of subsequent
crime within ninety days are effective, predictions of violence or danger
are less accurate.
Statutes authorizing preventive detention commonly mention vio-
lence as a decision standard for assessing pretrial danger.11 3 After
controlling for evidence of violence in both the current charge and
prior violence, the results suggest even more modest differences. For
rearrests for any offense, Table 3 shows significant differences only for
any rearrest; for violent felonies, differences exist with those current
charges. Of the Schall defendants with both current and prior vio-
lence charges, 58.8% were rearrested for any crime within ninety days,
compared to 20% of the controls (p[X2]=.040). None of the control
defendants charged with violent crimes but with no history of violence
were rearrested, compared to 41.7% of the Schall cases (p[X2]=.02 7 ]).
113 See Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 69-70 tbl. 7.
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For rearrests for violent offenses, the comparisons failed to produce
significant differences.
For defendants charged with other felonies, there were no signifi-
cant differences in rearrest within ninety days, regardless of prior rec-
ord or type of rearrest. For defendants charged with misdemeanors,
few were rearrested within the ninety day period. In fact, the rearrest
rates within ninety days were zero for nearly all groups. The results
show that even when defendants meet statutory standards for past
dangerousness, predictions of their future dangerousness are
unreliable.
Table 3
PERCENT REARRESTED WITHIN 90 DAYS BY TYPE OF REARREST CHARGE,
CONTROLLING FOR PRIOR VIOLENCE AND CURRENT CHARGES
REARREST CHARGES
ANY OFFENSE VioLENT FELONY
Schal Control p(X2) Schall Control p(X2)
N 69 64 69 64
Current Charge
Violent Felony
No Prior Violent 41.7 0 .027 16.7 0 a
Prior Violent 58.3 20.0 .040 33.3 13.3 .215
Other Felony
No Prior Violent 36.8 17.9 .143 21.1 7.1 .161
Prior Violent 57.1 28.6 .213 21.4 14.3 .694
Misdemeanor, PINS
Prior Violent 14.3 0 a 0 0 a
No Prior Violent 0 0 a 0 0 a
a Empty cells, no statistics computed
B. TIME TO FIRST REARREST
Comparisons were made between the time of the first rearrest
during the pretrial period to rearrests for either any offense or violent
crimes. The analyses controlled for the severity of the current and
past charges as well as the total number of prior court referrals. Only
defendants with one or more rearrests were included in the analyses.
The results are shown in Table 4.
Schall youths were rearrested more quickly than the controls for
both violent offenses and all offenses. The marginal gain in predictive
efficiency was significant and consistently high when Schall failure
rates are compared to controls, regardless of current or prior charges.
The mean failure time for any offense for Schall defendants charged
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Table 4
DAYS TO FIRST REARREST BY TYPE OF REARREST CHARGE, CONTROLLING
FOR PRIOR AND CURRENT CHARGES (MEAN, N, ANOVA)
R.ARRES CHARGES
ANY OFFENSE VIOLENT FELONY
Schall Control Schall Control
Current Charge
Violent Felony
No Prior Violent 126.6 294.1 357.5 754.7
Prior Violent 129.8 411.1 419.7 514.2
Other Felony
No Prior Violent 155.8 500.5 427.5 721.1
Prior Violent 75.7 311.8 206.3 396.5
Misdemeanor, PINS
No Prior Violent 441.7 1050.0 532.5 1050.0
Prior Violent 361.3 NA 1046.7 NA
ANOVA: p(F):
Main Effects
Group (Schall vs. Control) .000 .016
Current Charge .010 .072
Prior Violent Charge .980 .480
Interactions
Group by Charge .569 .956
Group by Prior Violent .916 .368
Charge by Prior Violent .358 .289
Covariates
Total # Prior Incidents .237 .428
NA. Empty cells, none rearrested.
rearrest.
Means are reported for defendants with at least one
with violent crimes was 126 days, but was over one year for rearrests
for violent offenses. Failure times were predictably higher for Schall
defendants charged with non-violent felonies, although quite short
(seventy-five days) for those with prior violent charges. Interaction
effects for group by current charge and group by prior violence were
not significant, indicating that the higher failure times for Schall de-
fendants were consistent for all subgroups. There also were no signifi-
cant effects for the total number of prior arrests, suggesting that
overall prior criminal activity also was unrelated to the mean failure
time.
Failure times for violent offenses for both Schall and control cases
were well beyond the ninety day threshold. Since dangerousness is
equated with violence in most preventive detention statutes, the re-
sults again show that the short-term predictions of subsequent danger-
ousness during the anticipated pretrial period are inaccurate. While
[Vol. 86
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
the court was able to accurately predict a group of offenders likely to
commit new violent offenses faster than other defendants, the ability
to make short-term predictions remains very limited.
However, analysis of failure times estimates differences in group
means for those who exhibit at least one failure event and provides an
incomplete picture of the differences between groups. Comparisons
of failure times do not examine the temporal pattern of recidivism
exhibited by the sample, including those who fail and those who do
not (those who "survive" until the end of the follow-up period). Un-
like failure time analyses, survival or hazard analyses estimate the
probability that an individual will fail during a given time period.
114
Accordingly, a proportional hazards models was used to estimate the
hazard rates, or probabilities of failure, for the two groups." 5 The
proportional hazards model is estimated by Cox regression, and the
model accounts for both the prevalence and the timing of the
rearrest.116
The Cox model maximizes a partial likelihood based only on
ranked non-censored cases." 7 In the multivariate case of Cox regres-
sion, partial likelihood provides the proportional hazards model with
unbiased and efficient" 8 estimates of the relative risk of rearrest asso-
ciated with changes in key predictor variables.
Cox regression is well suited to censored cases because of non-
failure during an interval. For example, in a study of the recidivism of
prison releasees, where data are simply (or singly) censored for a two
year follow-up period, it is known that only 50% of the cases were
rearrested, convicted, or returned to prison. Because of these cases,
the actual sample size changes as a function of time, and the exact
proportions failing and surviving during each interval cannot be
known. As a result, the hazard function cannot be calculated but
114 Christy A. Visher et al., Predicting the Recidivism of Serious Youthful Offenders Using Sur-
vival Models, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 329 (1991).
115 See PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORYANALYSIS (1984); MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM
(1984); PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WrrrE, PREDICTING RECIDMVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS
(1988); Paul J. Gruenwald & Barbara R. West, Survival Models of Recidivism Amongjuvenile
Delinquents, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 215 (1989).
116 See Visher et al., supra note 114; Christy A. Visher & Richard L. Linster, A Survival
Model of Pretrial Failure, 6J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1990) (basing their study on
the pretrial failure of a sample of male arrestees from the District of Columbia). See also
MALTZ supra note 115; SCHMIDT & WITTE, supra note 115; PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WrrrE,
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE: THEORY, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS
(1984); Chian-Fan Chung et al., Survival Analysis: A Survey, 7J. QUANTATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
59 (1991).
117 David R. Cox, Regression Models and Life Tables, 34J. ROYAL STAT. SoC'Y 187 (1972).
118 See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1990); EusA T. LEE, STATISTICAL
METHODS FOR SURVrVAL DATA ANALYSIS (1992); Allison, supra note 115; Bernard Efron, The
Efficiency of Cox's Likelihood Function for Censored Data, 72J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 567 (1977).
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must instead be estimated. ' 19 In a more sophisticated model, such as
the Weibull, this time function itself may have numerous
parameters.1
20
In a multivariate model, the efficacy of judicial predictions of
dangerousness are tested by introducing legal and extra-legal
predictors first, and then determining whether Schall cases differ sig-
nificantly in the estimation of the hazard function. We compared haz-
ard functions for both ninety and 365 day intervals and for rearrests
for any offense or a violent offense. The results are shown in Table 5.
The short-term, ninety day prediction model has direct relevance
for assessing the efficacy of preventive decisions that concern the pre-
trial period. The model for rearrest for any crime is significant
119 This is not the case with transition rate models such as Markov renewal, semi-Markov.
See ALLISON, supra note 115. Logit or probit models, which are suited uniquely to discrete
data, are not very adaptable to progressive censoring. With respect to discrete data, on the
other hand, Cox models are not as well suited as transition rate, logit or probit models. In
a full parametric model, such as the simple exponential specification, the hazard rate is
estimated in terms of a simple parameter, which represents an exponential constant time
function with respect to the failure rate.
120 SeeJordan Leiter, A Comparison of the Specific Deterrent Effects of Official Sanc-
tions Across Drug and Non-Drug Cohorts of Offenders in New York City Between 1983-88
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice).
The survival model is represented as
S(t) = e-t
and the hazard model as
h(t) =1
where h(t) is the hazard function, S(t) is the cumulative survival function, tis time, and is a
constant to be estimated. In the multivariate case, the model of the hazard function
becomes
h(t) = 1(t) + BiXi
where h (t) is the hazard function, BiXi is a vector of covariates, and I is a constant. In the
special case of the proportional hazards model, however, the time function is neither speci-
fied nor estimated thanks to the partial likelihood estimation procedure. The model is
usually represented as
h(t\X) = ho(t)e BiXi SCHMIDT & WrTrE, supra note 115.
or
log h(t) = a(t) + BiXi
where ho(t) or a(t) is a completely arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function.
The baseline hazard function represents the risk of failure as a function of time when all
variables are at their average values. The model assumes that the risks for all cases are
simple multiples of the baseline function, and the coefficients thus represent the change in
the relative risks of failure (in our case rearrest) associated with a unit change in the in-
dependent variable in question. This assumption of relative or proportional risks is the
most vulnerable assumption for this type of model, and it must be verified, either through
the introduction of time varying covariates, or stratification.
The most distinctive feature of the proportional hazards model is that the B's are
estimated without specifying ho(t) or a(t), hence the nomenclature are semi-parametric.
The partial likelihood test used in Cox regression constructs a likelihood function depend-
ing upon the unknown parameters (the B's) and the observed data, Cox, supra note 117,
and then finds parameter values that maximize this function based only on those cases that




PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL FOR SHORT AND LONG-TERM
REARRESTS, SC-ALL VS. CONTROL CASES (COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD
ERRORS,AND SIGNIFICANCE OF T-RATIO)a
REARRESTED IN 90 DAYS ANY REARREST
Any Violent Any Violent
Offense Offense Offense Offense
DEMOGRAPHICS
Female -1.11 .29 -. 60 -. 25
(1.05) (1.09) (.51) (.55)
Asian -12.25 -10.48 -. 53 .14
(418.83) (263.10) (.61) (.61)
Hispanic -. 36 -. 17 -. 33 -. 52
(.41) (.56) (.25) (.28)
White .58 -. 78 .11 -. 78
(.48) (1.06) (.35) (.41)
Age at First Contact -. 14* -. 05 -. 03 -. 02
(.07) (.11) (.04) (.05)
Age at Arrest .10 .01 .03 -. 003
(.10) (.12) (.04) (.05)
PRIOR RECORD
Total Priors .10 .19* .10* .14
(.07) (.09) (.05) (.06)
Prior Violence .26 -. 15 -. 17 -. 50
(.41) (.60) (.27) (.30)
CURRENT CHARGES
Felony Violence 2.33* 11.04 1.69*** 1.76***
(1.05) (113.20) (.41) (.47)
Oth&i Felony 2.33* 10.82 1.36*** 1.27**
(1.03) (113.21) (.40) (.46)
SCHALL. CASE -. 69*** -. 61* -. 42*** -.45***
(.20) (.28) (.11) (.12)
MODEL STATISTICS:
-2 Log Likelihood 323.87 155.59 860.35 752.50
Model Chi-square 33.62*** 17.26 36.81*** 35.09***
Change Chi-square 36.17*** 18.07 38.93*** 35.88***
a p(Wald): * p <.05 **p <.01 *** p <.001
(X2=3. 6 2, p<.001). Significant predictors in the hazard function in-
clude age at first juvenile court contact (younger), and a current
charge for a violent felony offense. The coefficient for Schall cases is
also significant, indicating the greater likelihood of rearrest for Schall
cases during the ninety day period. However, the model for rearrest
for a violent offense is not significant (X2 =17 .2 6, p=.1004), indicating
that the model with predictors does not differ significantly from a
model with no predictors. In other words, the prediction of pretrial




PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL FOR SHORT AND LONG-TERM
REARRESTS, SCIZALL SAMPLE ONLY (COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRoRs,






































































































-2 Log Likelihood 207.78 95.98 391.99 323.59
Model Chi-square 14.99 11.71 18.68* 18.66*
Change Chi-square 16.64 11.74 14.87*** 9.95**
a p(Wald): * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
chance.
The long-term prediction models also show that Schall cases are
more likely to be rearrested for either a violent offense or any offense
within 365 days of their preventive detention. The model for rearrest
for any offense within one year is significant (X2= 3 6.8 1, p<.001). Prior
record and current charges for either felony violence or another fel-
ony are significant predictors. The coefficient for Schall cases is signif-
icant, again indicating the greater likelihood of their rearrest. The
results are the same for rearrest for a violent offense, although prior
record is not significant in that model.
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To determine whether the elements of danger were themselves
predictors of rearrest during the pretrial period, the analyses in Table
5 were repeated only for the Schall cases. The models in Table 6 were
not significant, for both short and long-term rearrests. In fact, for
short-term rearrests for both any offense and violent offenses, the results
run counter to the operational definitions of dangerousness. In the
short-term ninety day model, the coefficients for a current violent fel-
ony were negative, while the coefficients for prior violence were not
significant. Rearrest for any offense was predicted better by a current
charge for a non-violent felony. None of the predictors were signifi-
cant for the models of rearrest for a violent offense. The long-term pre-
diction models were significant (X2=1 8 .6 8, p<.05) for rearrest for any
offense and also for rearrest for a violent offense (X2=18. 6 6, p<.01).
In these models, current violent charges were significant but prior vio-
lence was not.
The accuracy of prediction of dangerousness during the pretrial
period remains questionable. The prediction models are not signifi-
cant for violent rearrests once we control prior and current danger-
ousness. While predictions of a broad range of pretrial crimes are
efficient, the prediction of dangerousness is unreliable. Presumably,
it is the protection from danger that justifies the false prediction and
deprivation of liberty in over half of the Schall cases. Yet in using the
statutory criteria and definitions for determining dangerousness, we
are unable to estimate an efficient model for predicting such danger
in the short term. The models were constructed so as to permit assess-
ments ofjudicial predictions after controlling for the degree of risk or
dangerousness in the population. The models fail to demonstrate
such efficiency. Even the unmeasured factors inherent in the Schall
prediction, those that would influence the coefficient after controls
for legal and extra-legal factors, do not lead to an efficient prediction
of pretrial danger. Whatever additional, unmeasured risks influenced
the Schall prediction, they were not sufficient to yield an efficient pre-
diction model.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The capacity to select from among a group of accused delin-
quents those who pose an elevated risk of criminality in the legally
critical interval following arrest is clear from the study. These results
are all the more impressive given the limited nature of the informa-
tion available to the judges at the time of the detention decision. Yet
the results are ambiguous with respect to the marginal gain in predic-
tive efficiency compared to the base rate of offending for this class of
1996]
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adolescents. The extent of unwarranted detention increases when the
statutory basis for preventive detention is narrowed to the dangerous-
ness criteria evident in the Federal Bail Reform Act12 1 and in the ma-
jority of state preventive detention statutes. 122 The results do not
suggest that the judges were wrong in concluding that the class of
Schalljuveniles posed a "serious risk" that they would commit a crime.
Rather, this study simply may help us to quantify that term.
A. ABSOLUTE AND MARGINAL GAINS IN BASE RATE PREDICTIONS
Would an actuarial prediction improve predictive efficiency?
When a particular defendant fits the statistical profile for a high base
rate group, we could detain that individual based on an actuarial use
of prediction with the same predictive validity and efficiency. In this
study, that would mean if we detained all of the Schall youths without
any benefit of a clinical assessment of dangerousness, one-out-of-six de-
tainees would have committed a crime if released. The judges in the
Schall study clearly improved on this actuarial prediction.
However, this improvement actually means that the judges de-
tained 25% more juveniles who would have committed a crime if re-
leased than had the judges detained the entire group based on
actuarial predictions. In other words, detaining the entire control
group would result in the needless detention of five youths to "catch"
the sixth who would have recidivated within the pretrial period. De-
taining the Schall group would result in the needless detention of six-
youths-in-ten to "catch" the four who would have recidivated.
These differences are conservative estimates, since the compari-
sons were based on criteria that were limited to objective factors and
did not include the social and behavioral cues that often guide deten-
tion decisions: demeanor, victim injury, parental involvement at the
detention hearing, and details about current or past crimes. Had
more detailed matching criteria been used, we would expect to nar-
row the gap in rearrest rates between Schall and any type of control
group.
23
121 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
122 Goldkamp, supra note 2, at 71-73 tbl. 8.
123 Differences between Schall and control cases in their actual criminality during the
pretrial period may be far narrower than is indicated by the rearrest rates. For example,
among "high rate" offenders, the annual number of self-reported crimes is nearly seven
times higher than the number of crimes for which youths are arrested. See DELBIRT S.
ELLIOTT ET AL., MULTIPLE PROBLEM YOUTH (1989); see also Thomas R. Litwack & Louis B.
Schlesinger, Assessing and Predicting Twlence: Research, Law and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen Y. Hess eds., 1987).
However, these estimates do not alter the conclusions of this study for two reasons.




When narrowed to violent crimes, 124 the decision standard that
guides preventive detention statutes in many state predictions are
inefficient and the performance is unacceptable. Over 80% of the
Scha!ljuveniles were not rearrested for a violent offense within the
normative pretrial confinement period. Such performance stands at
odds with constitutional concerns over false imprisonment and equal
protection: "The high rate of false positives demonstrates that the abil-
ity to predict future crimes-and especially violent crimes-is so poor
that such predictions will be wrong in the vast majority of cases.
Therefore, judges should not use [public safety concerns] as an in-
dependent justification for major deprivations of liberty such as
detention."
25
Given the adverse consequences for defendants, we should be
quite sure that preventive detention will avoid the commission of a
very serious crime. Detaining ten arrestees to prevent six from gam-
bling in public, for example, ought clearly to be unacceptable. 26 Yet,
only 36.9% of the Schall youths were charged with a violent felony at
the time of court appearance. More than six-out-of-ten of the Schall
youths would have been ineligible for preventive detention under
most adult preventive detention statutes. Limiting detention to those
accused of violent offenses obviously is fairer to the defendant because
this limitation precludes a large class of individuals from eligibility for
preventive detention. However, Tables 5 and 6 show that even this
limitation on eligibility may be unrelated to the accuracy of the pre-
diction of violence during the pretrial period.
It is difficult to assess this overinclusiveness. The statutes, nar-
rowly interpreted, would suggest that the rate of false positives is unac-
ceptable. It is only when we allow a wide, standardless definition of
pretrial danger that the efficacy of the predictions even begins to
make sense. In New York, the statute is so vague as to be meaningless
ciency of short-term predictions. Second, extrapolation from prevalence to incidence
among sample members does not imply an increase in prevalence within the sample. That
is, while the actual offending rate of arrested offenders may be higher than the arrest rate
indicates, this does not imply that other members of the sample were actively involved in
crimes during the same period. Seeing the tip of an iceberg lends only minimal support to
the claim that there are other icebergs in the area, or that they are of the same
proportions.
124 Assault, robbery, sex-related crimes, kidnapping, homicide, and manslaughter, for
which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for greater than one year.
125 See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 18, at 386.
126 This example is used because in Schall one of the juveniles was detained to prevent
him from playing three-card monte-a con-artist's gambling game-on the streets. 467
U.S. 253, 295 n.21 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (1984).
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with respect to what is being predicted: both petty and minor offenses
would comprise the decision standard for dangerousness. This undif-
ferentiated standard runs the risk of predicting everything and noth-
ing at the same time.
It is one thing to disadvantage the accused by detaining him or
her to prevent violent felonies. It is quite another to disadvantage a
detainee in the outcome of the pending charge. We suggest that this
power should be sharply attenuated given the considerable adverse
impact detention has on the detainee. 127 Such detention amounts to
unregulated punishment.
Ordinarily, the law will not tolerate deprivations of liberty for pu-
nitive purposes without a very high degree of certainty of guilt. The
Schall cases emphasize the importance of this presumption. Although
judges had concluded that the Schalljuveniles posed a sufficient risk
to society in order to require detention upon arrest, more than half
were never convicted of the crime for which they were arrested (data
not shown). It is impossible to determine what these numbers would
have been had the Schall group been confined (that is, with no federal
court intervention). But it is likely that a considerably higher percent-
age of juveniles would have been convicted. As studies have consist-
ently shown, when one is detained before trial, the case usually results
in conviction. s28 We know of no study in which the conviction rate of
detainees was below 50%. Preventive detention not only results in
unnecessary pretrial incarceration of individuals, it also restricts access
to a viable defense, and prejudices case outcomes by detention status.
These burdens suggest a careful and conservative use of this power.
There are reasonable and constitutional arguments to incapaci-
tate a presumptively innocent individual when we are certain he or
she is dangerous. But whenever a significant number of persons are
preventively detained, many individuals will be deprived of their lib-
erty even though they would not have endangered the community. In
light of the great cost to defendants in terms of case outcomes and
sanctions, and the marginal gains to society in crimes averted, preven-
tive detention appears to be unjustified.'
2 9
127 "The power of plea bargaining in the pretrial process where the defendant is de-
tained is extraordinary; only 1% to 10% of all defendants ever make it to the trial stage. A
first offender detainee is more likely to be convicted and severely sentenced than a
recividist with more than ten prior arrests who was released before trial." Miller & Guggen-
heim, supra note 18, at 339 n.33 (citing Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: the Need for Due
Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Tria, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 441, 456-57).
128 Ares et al., supra note 78.
129 SeeJackson, supra note 75, at 332-33.
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